Treaty of Tientsin.
Policy pursued
by the Chinese
Government.
Its conduct since the suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion.
Frequent outrages lately committed on Foreigners in China.
The Chinese
ought to be
compelled to perform the Treaty.
(2)
5. The Treaty of Tientsin purports to be a Treaty of "Peace, Friendship, Com-merce" between England and China, and though in many particulars and Navigation defective, it undoubtedly contained provisions which, had they been faithfully observed by the Chinese, would have led to an enormous increase of mercantile transactions between the two countries; and which, we believe, must also have largely conduced to increased civilization, and consequent improvement in the political and social condition of the Chinese. We complain, however, that some of its most important provisions have been altogether disregarded, while others have been systematically evaded.
6. The Chinese Government, corrupt and inert, deficient in centralised authority, and in many respects utterly powerless against the Mandarins of the interior, has virtually done nothing to carry out its obligations, except when compelled by pressure to perform them. From the Chinese point of view, this policy was doubtless the wisest it could adopt under the circumstances; because it was the one most embarrassing to foreign Powers, who felt great difficulty in dealing with a Government, that in effect proclaimed itself impotent. We are free to admit too that, until the Tai-ping Rebellion was crushed, it would have been both impolitic and oppressive, to have been unduly rigorous in compelling the strict observance of some of the provisions of the Treaty.
7. The Chinese Government succeeded in putting down the Rebellion, in great measure owing to foreign material aid; and after its suppression, no further violation or evasion of the Treaty ought to have been permitted. The Government had been effectually supported by foreign States, whose combined action would have enabled it to reduce to obedience its refractory officials, and so have produced such a moral effect throughout the Empire, as to render needless any recourse to violent measures to enforce Treaty rights. Unfortunately other counsels prevailed: the Foreign Ministers at Peking allowed the favorable opportunity to pass; and since then, they have overlooked the infractions complained of; have in some instances excused or palliated the actions of Chinese Mandarins; while they have disregarded the representations of the resident merchants; to whom on more than one occasion, interested and improper motives have most unwarrantably been imputed. The result is lamentable. Emboldened by impunity, the Chinese continue resolutely and openly to disregard their Treaty obligations; and the numerous and deliberate insults and outrages on their part which have of late been brought so prominently to notice, must give rise to well-founded apprehension.
8. It cannot be attributed to isolated antipathy to Foreigners, that within so short a period and in Provinces so distant from each other, we have to record the outrages at Yangchow, the robberies and murders in Formosa, the attack on Mr. Wolfe at Foochow, the refusal by Prince KUNG to receive the Duke of Edinburgh, and the recent attack at Ghankin and subsequent insult reported to have been offered to the British Minister by the Tao-Tai of Nanking. It scarcely admits of a doubt that, true to their old instincts, the Mandarins are again exciting amongst the ignorant and prejudiced classes, violent hatred against all foreigners, in the vain hope of being able, by combined action, at once and for ever to rid the country of them. In such a critical state of affairs, it becomes more than ever the duty of the British Government seriously to consider what will be the probable result should the policy advocated at home be persisted in. We fear that it must infallibly lead to a war, and at no very distant date, between England and China; and, therefore, it is that we feel it incumbent on us to give expression to our opinion upon this momentous subject.
9. The question to be decided is,--has the time arrived when the Chinese ought to be compelled to observe in its integrity the Treaty of Tientsin? We say that though grand opportunity of doing so with the utmost facility, was lost some years ago on the suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion, it can still be done without the exercise of undue pressure. The longer however the matter is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty of dealing with it, and the more imminent will be the danger of a war. Like all Eastern nations, the Chinese are destitute of any sense of political honor; and the only obligations their Rulers will ever acknowledge, are those they are enforced to observe. Delays on our part to insist upon our rights, far from being considered as an indulgence for which they ought to be grateful, are simply construed to be signs of weakness; and, therefore, the longer we defer to exact from them the strict performance of the Treaty, the more firmly will they be impressed with the idea that we are afraid of a rupture, and the more obstinate will they be in evading or violating its provisions. We cannot do better than quote the following forcible expressions used by Sir RUTHERFORD ALCOCK in his despatch of the 5th of February, 1869, to Lord STANLEY, your Lordship's predecessor as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:-
"Experience leads infallibly to the conviction that where Treaties have been "imposed by force upon an unwilling Government, as all with China have been, "they can only be upheld by similar means.
64
"The diplomatic instrument has no binding power with Chinese when its stipulations may be evaded with impunity, or whenever it is believed that the force that imposed them is no longer extant or available.
"Diplomacy in such circumstances means armed reason, the only evidence of 'power or title to respect a true Oriental freely recognizes, and in order that foreign Powers may not have to resort to such rude instruments for proving "their title, it behoves them to find means of preventing accumulative violations of "Treaty, since continued impunity brings with it a conviction of weakness.
"It is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invariably provokes aggression, "and with Eastern nations, is a far more fruitful cause of bad faith and danger "than either force or the abuse of it.
"The desire to avoid complications and wars in the far East should suggest, "not an unreasoning recoil from the assertion of Treaty rights from fear of the "troubles it may bring, but a steadfast adherence to such conditions of intercourse 'as experience has proved to be best calculated in the end to ensure respect for "engagements."
We deprecate a further delay in compelling the due observance of the Tientsin Treaty, because we fear that it will only tend to those accumulative violations, which the British Minister declares too often occasion hostilities.
10. This leads us to the consideration of those provisions of the Treaty of Tientsin, of the infraction of which we have long complained; and which we think ought in future to be strictly enforced; and we shall take them in their numerical order.
11. The 9th clause by which British subjects are authorised to travel for pleasure or trading purposes to all parts of the interior is inoperative, except to some extent as regards the former object. The time has arrived when all unnecessary restrictions on travelling, which were perhaps necessary in some portions of the Empire during the Rebellion of the Tai-pings, ought to be done away with. No injury can possibly accrue to the Chinese Government by their removal; because in all cases Passports must be issued by the Foreign Consuls, who would exercise their discretion in granting permits, and withhold them when applied for by dangerous or suspicious characters. The right to trade in the interior was undoubtedly acquired by the Treaty of Tientsin, and the privilege having been withheld in practice from British subjects is as much the result of a retrogressive foreign policy as of conservative action on the part of the Chinese.
12. That great benefit would be derived by both countries from increased intercourse between British and Chinese subjects, is certain. The experience of the past proves it. In spite of the vexatious restrictions which have so improperly been imposed by the Chinese Government, and the narrow limits within which we have hitherto been permitted to carry on our trade directly, it has increased enormously within the last few years; and if the vast and fertile Provinces still closed to us were opened to the foreign merchant, it is almost impossible to calculate what dimensions our commerce with China would attain. Take for
275
Treaty of Tientsin.
Policy pursued
by the Chinese
Government.
Its conduct since the suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion.
Frequent out. rages lately committed on Foreigners in Chine.
The Chinese
ought to be
compelled to perform the Treaty.
merce,
(2)
5. The Treaty of Tientsin purports to be a Treaty of "Peace, Friendship, Com- " between England and China, and though in many particulars and Navigation"] defective, it undoubtedly contained provisions which, had they been faithfully observed by the Chinese, would have led to an enormous increase of mercantile transactions between the two countries; and which, we believe, must also have largely conduced to increased civilization, and consequent improvement in the political and social condition of the Chinese. We complain, however, that some of its most important provisions have been altogether disregarded, while others have been systema- tically evaded.
6. The Chinese Government, corrupt and inert, deficient in centralised authority, and in many respects utterly powerless against the Mandarins of the interior, has virtually done nothing to carry out its obligations, except when compelled by From the Chinese point of view, this policy was pressure to perform them. doubtless the wisest it could adopt under the circumstances; because it was the one most embarrassing to foreign Powers, who felt great difficulty in dealing with a Government, that in effect proclaimed itself impotent. We are free to admit too that, until the Tai-ping Rebellion was crushed, it would have been both impolitic and oppressive, to have been unduly rigorous in compelling the strict observance of some of the provisions of the Treaty.
7. The Chinese Government succeeded in putting down the Rebellion, in great measure owing to foreign material aid; and after its suppression, no further viola- tion or evasion of the Treaty ought to have been permitted. The Government had been effectually supported by foreign States, whose combined action would have enabled it to reduce to obedience its refractory officials, and so have produced such a moral effect throughout the Empire, as to render needless any recourse to violent measures to enforce Treaty rights. Unfortunately other counsels prevailed: the Foreign Ministers at Peking allowed the favorable opportunity to pass; and since then, they have overlooked the infractions complained of; have in some instances excused or palliated the actions of Chinese Mandarins; while they have disregarded the representations of the resident merchants; to whom on more than one occasion, interested and improper motives have most unwarrantably been imputed. The result is lamentable. Emboldened by impunity, the Chinese con- tinue resolutely and openly to disregard their Treaty obligations; and the numerous and deliberate insults and outrages on their part which have of late been brought so prominently to notice, must give rise to well founded apprehension.
8. It cannot be attributed to isolated antipathy to Foreigners, that within so short a period and in Provinces so distant from each other, we have to record the outrages at Yangchow, the robberies and murders in Formosa, the attack on Mr. Wolfe at Foochow, the refusal by Prince KUNG to receive the Duke of Edinburgh, and the recent attack at Ghankin and subsequent insult reported to have been offered to the British Minister by the Tao-Tai of Nanking. It scarcely admits of a doubt that, true to their old instincts, the Mandarins are again exciting amongst the ignorant and prejudiced classes, violent hatred against all foreigners, in the vain hope of being able, by combined action, at once and for ever to rid the country of them. In such a critical state of affairs, it becomes more than ever the duty of the British Government seriously to consider what will be the probable result should the policy advocated at home be persisted in. We fear that it must infallibly lead to a war, and at no very distant date, between England and China; and, therefore, it is that we feel it incumbent on us to give expression to our opinion upon this momentous subject.
9. The question to be decided is,--has the time arrived when the Chinese ought to be compelled to observe in its integrity the Treaty of Tientsin? We say that though grand opportunity of doing so with the utmost facility, was lost some years ago on the suppression of the Tai-ping Rebellion, it can still be done without the exercise of unduc pressure. The longer however the matter is postponed, the greater will be the difficulty of dealing with it, and the more imminent will be the danger of a war. Like all Eastern nations, the Chinese are destitute of any sense of political
Remarks by Str
R. ALCOCK (20 the Chinese.
Infractions by the Chinese of the Tientsin Treaty.
9th Clanse, Traveling in the Interior.
Benefits that would accrue to both countries by
course.
(8)
honor; and the only obligations their Rulers will ever acknowledge, are those they are enforced to observe. Delays on our part to insist upon our rights, far from being considered as an indulgence for which they ought to be grateful, are simply construed to be signs of weakness; and, therefore, the longer we defer to exact from them the strict performance of the Treaty, the more firmly will they be impressed with the idea that we are afraid of a rupture, and the more obstinate will they be in evading or violating its provisions. We cannot do better than quote the following forcible expressions used by Sir RUTHERFORD ALCOCK in his despatch of the 5th of February, 1869, to Lord STANLEY, your Lordship's pre- decessor as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:-
"Experience leads infallibly to the conviction that where Treaties have been "imposed by force upon an unwilling Government, as all with China have been, "they can only be upheld by similar means.
64
"The diplomatic instrument has no binding power with Chinese when its stipulations may be evaded with impunity, or whenever it is believed that the force that imposed them is no longer extant or available.
"Diplomacy in such circumstances means armed reason, the only evidence of 'power or title to respect a true Oriental freely recognizes, and in order that foreign Powers may not have to resort to such rude instruments for proving "their title, it behoves them to find means of preventing accumulative violations of "Treaty, since continued impunity brings with it a conviction of weakness.
"It is weakness, or the suspicion of it, which invariably provokes aggression, "and with Eastern nations, is a far more fruitful cause of bad faith and danger "than either force or the abuse of it.
"The desire to avoid complications and wars in the far East should suggest, "not an unreasoning recoil from the assertion of Treaty rights from fear of the "troubles it may bring, but a steadfast adherence to such conditions of intercourse 'as experience has proved to be best calculated in the end to ensure respect for "engagements."
We deprecate a further delay in compelling the due observance of the Tientsin Treaty, because we fear that it will only tend to those accumulative violations," which the British Minister declares too often occasion hostilities.
10. This leads us to the consideration of those provisions of the Treaty of Tien- tsin, of the infraction of which we have long complained; and which we think ought in future to be strictly enforced; and we shall take them in their numerical order. 11. The 9th clause by which British subjects are authorised to travel for pleasure or trading purposes to all parts of the interior is inoperative, except to some extent as regards the former object. The time has arrived when all unnecessary restrictions on travelling, which were perhaps necessary in some portions of the Empire during the Rebellion of the Tai-pings, ought to be done away with. No injury can possibly accrue to the Chinese Government by their removal; because in all cases Passports must be issued by the Foreign Consuls, who would exercise their discretion in granting permits, and withhold them when applied for by dangerous or suspicious characters. The right to trade in the interior was undoubtedly acquired by the Treaty of Tientsin, and the privilege having been withheld in practice from British subjects is as much the result of a retrogressive foreign policy as of conservative action on the part of the Chinese.
12. That great benefit would be derived by both countries from increased inter- extended Intor course between British and Chinese subjects, is certain. The experience of the past proves it. In spite of the vexatious restrictions which have so improperly been imposed by the Chinese Government, and the narrow limits within which we have hitherto been permitted to carry on our trade directly, it has increased enormously within the last few years; and if the vast and fertile Provinces still closed to us were opened to the foreign merchant, it is almost impossible to calculate what dimensions our commerce with China would attain. Take for
275
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.